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The Adversary System in Canadian 
Industrial Relations 
Blight or Blessing? 
C.R. Brookbank 
This article attempts to explore the "free System of collective 
bargaining" in Canada, with a view to gaining insight into the 
validity and the efficacity of the adversary concept in industrial 
relations. 
As Canadians, we appear to relish a substantial amount of conflict in 
our national sport, the game of hockey. We feel that it reflects the rug-
gedness of our people and the vitality of our culture. In Parliament, 
likewise, we cherish the principle of a Loyal Opposition whose rôle is to 
challenge and criticize government activities. We consider that this "power 
to oppose' ' keeps governments honest in motive and sensitive to the com-
mon welfare. In short, we tend to believe, as Canadians that conflict con-
trolled by the rules of the game - or the House - is of fundamental impor-
tance to integrity and progress, even though it may sometimes get out of 
hand in both environments. 
How is it, then, that many of us find controlled conflict distasteful in 
labour - management relations, where it also tends to get out of hand on 
some occasions? Why is there a considérable body of opinion in Canada to 
the effect that the "adversary system" in labour-management relations is 
out of date? In a country whose citizens tend to resent controls of virtually 
any kind, how is it that a seemingly large number would be quite pleased to 
see compulsary arbitration introduced as a reasonable alternative to the 
strike or lockout in many collective bargaining endeavours? 
Every society must hâve rules setting out the requirements for social 
behaviour by its citizens, and sanctions which can be applied when in-
dividuals or groups violate the rules or jeopardize the common welfare. If 
the control of déviants becomes such an obsession that enforcement 
* BROOKBANK, C.R., Professor, School of Business Administration, Dalhousie 
University, Halifax. 
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measures may begin to jeopardize fundamental principles of the society 
itself, the cure could be worse than the disease in the last analysis. This arti-
cle will attempt to explore our "free System of collective bargaining", with 
a view to gaining insight into the validity and the efficacy of the adversary 
concept in industrial relations. 
A look at the présent state of affairs regarding work stoppages1 may 
help in assessing the extent of "extrême conflict ,\ often cited as justifica-
tion for abandoning the adversary relationship within the industrial rela-
tions System. Figure 1 illustrâtes the record of work stoppages due to strikes 
and lockouts from 1971 to 1978 inclusive. It can be seen that thèse declined 
somewhat during the period of wage and price controls (October 1975 to 
April 1978) but now appear to be on the rise again. The number of man-
days lost and of workers involved dropped drastically in 1977, however, in-
dicating work stoppages of much shorter duration that in 1976 and pro-
bably of smaller units. For 1977 in particular, it would appear that work 
stoppages were curtailed where larger unions and employers were concern-
ed. 
TABLE 1 
Time Perspective on Work Stoppages 
État rétrospectif des arrêts de travail 
Work stoppages i n existence during %of 
month or year estimated 
Arrêts de travail en cours pendant working time 
le mois ou l'année 
Period Number Workers Duration in 
involved man-days % du temps 
ouvrable 
Période Nombre Travailleurs 
en cause 
Durée en 
jours-hommes 
estimatif 
Year-Année 
1971 569 239,631 2,866,590 0.16 
1972 598 706,474 7,753,530 0.43 
1973 724 348,470 5,776,080 0.30 
1974 1,218 580,912 9,221,890 0.46 
1975 1,171 506,443 10,908,810 0.53 
1976 1,030 1,582,631 10,624,130 0.55 
1977 803 217,557 3,307,880 0.15 
1978 949 385,405 7,480,030 0.33 
i Thèse figures are issued by Labour Canada; the data for 1978 are listed as "subject to 
revision". 
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The number of stoppages in 1978 has not increased substantially, but 
the percentage of lost working time has more than doubled over 1977 and 
the number of man-days-lost has increased almost to the same point. Accor-
ding to figures released by Labour Canada for 1978, much of this increase 
in lost working time and number of man-days lost can be attributed to a few 
large altercations. The two largest stoppages under fédéral jurisdiction in 
1978 were at B.C. Téléphone and Canada Post Office, accounting for 60% 
of fédéral figures. Inco Metals Ltd. in Ontario, iron mining in Québec and 
Labrador, and construction carpenters in Ontario represented 27% of ail 
man-day losses under provincial jurisdiction. It would not appear that the 
departure of wage and price controls has brought any great surge of strikes, 
but there hâve been a few severe and serious ones. Removal of the right to 
strike/lockout might constrain the severe cases but it would also impose 
controls on the many who settle with little or no resort to stoppage. 
Of more concern than the absolute numbers of stoppages, workers in-
volved, and man-days lost is the gênerai increase in percentage of estimated 
working time lost, since this is relative to ail of the others. In this respect, 
the time lost in 1978 was équivalent to 33 man-days per 10,000 man-days 
worked, compared to .15 (15 man-days) in 1977 and .55 in 1976. 
While thèse percentages foliow a pattern similar to the others, it is 
worth noting that this is not the first time in the history of Canadian in-
dustrial relations that thèse percentages hâve reached présent levels. In 
1919, the percentage of lost working time through work stoppages was .60; 
in 1946, it was .54. Thèse percentages are based on a ratio of number of 
man-days lost for every 10,000 man-days worked, e.g. 53 lost per 10,000 in 
1975. While there are many more union members in Canada now than in 
1919, or even in 1946, the relative loss of working time is no more severe. 
The ' 'system" seems to be functioning normally. 
Thèse interprétations of the statistics are not intended to imply that our 
problems in labour-management relations are of little conséquence, but 
rather to suggest that more refined analysis of the situation can bring more 
appropriate and feasible solutions than disposing of the adversary system 
and running the proverbial risk of "losing the baby with the bath water". 
Even so, it must be acknowledged that in 1976 Canada vied with Italy, on a 
list of 35 countries, for the most time lost due to strikes and lockouts. 
Canada had 55 man-days lost per 10,000 worked during that year. 
Over the years, the Canadian pattern of industrial relations has con-
sistently brought about peaceful settlements in the majority of cases. 
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Jamieson2 makes gênerai référence to a figure of 5% or less of negotiations 
related to collective agreements in Canada that resuit in strikes or lockouts, 
but this rate is low for some periods. In 1976, as shown in Figure 2, Labour 
Canada records 637 agreements negotiated in the industrial sector (ex-
cluding construction) of the economy in Canada; of those, ail but 84 (13.2 
per cent) were settled without work stoppages. In 1977, ail except 33 (5.7 per 
cent) of 577 agreements in the industrial sector were settled amicably. In 
1978, ail but 6.5% (44) were concluded without stoppages. A very respec-
table record, but why is it that we seem unable to overcome the "crisis" syn-
drome of peaks and troughs in work stoppages? 
A fruitful search for answers to this question might be undertaken 
through an analysis of the collective bargaining System itself rather than 
through an exploration of labour économies or labour law, although it is 
unrealistic to assume that such highly complex and interdependent com-
ponents can be separated easily for purposes of analysis. Indeed it could be 
argued that attempts to extract simple "cause and effect" séquences as adé-
quate interprétations of thèse complex trends has tended more to confuse 
the issue than to clarify possible problems. 
In broad terms, what are the implications of employer, union and 
government behaviour during the past décade in Canadian industrial rela-
tions? The interprétations set forth below constitute an analysis of 
developments which may be of interest and value to employers, unions, and 
governments who hâve the power and responsibility for coping with the ap-
parent instability of the adversary System. 
The adversary System represents the foundation of employer-union 
relations in this country. It has developed traditionally in Canada with the 
private sector and it is constituted ideally on the assumption that a strong 
employer and a strong union, each with a respect for the power of the other, 
can negotiate a collective agreement which will integrate the interests of 
both parties more effectively than any method which would give either side 
(or a third party) the unilatéral power to make décisions for both. The con-
frontation of thèse two groups in a "balance of power" has revolved 
around the distribution of the fruits of économie endeavour, with govern-
ment maintaining a législative régulation of the bipartite relationship as 
guardian of the public interest. With the parties sharing control over the 
process, there is the further assumption that both sides will feel a sensé of 
responsibility for the effective administration of the collective agreement 
2 JAMIESON, S., Industrial Relations in Canada, Macmillan Company, Toronto, pp. 
78-79. 
TABLE 2 
Number and Percentage of Settlements and Employées 
by Settlement Stage and by Industry, 1977-1978 
(500 or more Employées per Bargaining Unit, 
Excluding the Construction Industry) 
Nombre et pourcentage de nouvelles conventions et de 
travailleurs par stade de règlement et par industrie, 1977-1978 
(tous les groupes de négociation de 500 travailleurs ou plus 
autres que ceux de l'industrie de la construction) 
Bargaining 
Négociation 
Year Agreements Employées 
Année Conventions Travailleurs 
Third Party Intervention 
Intervention d'une tierce partie 
Agreements Employées 
Conventions Travailleurs 
Work Stoppage 
Arrêt de travail 
Agreements Employées 
Conventions Travailleurs 
AU Industries/Toutes les industries 
1976 281 (44.1) 704,945 (50.3) 272 (42.7) 581,165(41.5) 84 (13.2) 115,885 (3.7) 637 
1977 297 (51.6) 551,790(53.0) 247 (42.6) 450,065(43.2) 33 (5.7) 38,870 (3.7) 577 
1978 286 (42.4) 421,510(32.1) 344 (51.0) 805,250(61.4) 44 (6.5) 82,970 (6.3) 674 
AU Stages 
Tous les stades 
A grée m en ts * Employées 
Conventions* Travailleurs 
1,401,995 
1,040,725 
1,309,730 
•Due to the possibility of a multi-province agreement having more 
than one settlement stage for one agreement, the total number of set-
tlement stages may exceed the total number of settlement. 
*Le nombre total de stades de règlement peut excéder le nombre total 
de règlement, étant donné la possibilité qu'une convention collective 
couvrant plus d'une province peut avoir plus d'un stade de règlement. 
THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN CANADIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 25 
and will possess the detailed knowledge and awareness of its intent, a factor 
which is often critical in making effective administration of the agreement 
possible. 
As with any other human System, the practice of collective bargaining 
in Canada has not been a pure reflection3 of the theory. For one thing, the 
balance of power which undergirds an atmosphère of mutual respect bet-
ween employer and union is not always évident. This is particularly so when 
either party cannot "bargain from strength" because of inadéquate 
resources such as financial support, size, strong affiliations and the like. 
Imbalance of power can create temptations for the more powerful to use 
that power arbitrarily against the less powerful. For another thing, the 
lockout was intended theoretically to be the employer weapon to counteract 
the strike weapon of the union, but until recently the lockout has not been 
used to any extent in Canadian industrial relations. This has contributed to 
power imbalance on occasion and it has placed added responsibility on 
government to control arbitrary uses of power. 
In spite of such shortcomings, the adversary system was effective 
enough to cause the Government of Canada to legislate, in 1967 under the 
Public Service Staff Relations Act, a pattern of collective bargaining for its 
own employées in the public sector which embraced similar principles of 
confrontation, insofar as this was feasible. This was a step taken with good 
intentions and with an implicit faith in the viability of the adversary system. 
In retrospect, it has produced some unexpected conséquences which merit 
considération in the light of présent circumstances. It is becoming increas-
ingly évident that inconsistencies between theory and practice also exist in 
the public sector. Government now has a responsibility as an employer deal-
ing with unions as well as a regulator of the private sector. This represents a 
new and significant dimension which has emerged within the past twelve 
years, meriting depth considération in any analysis of the total adversary 
system in Canada. 
For purposes of this discussion, public sector union members are con-
sidered to be those whose bargaining rights are established under the Public 
Service Staff Relations Act and whose employer is the fédéral government. 
3 BROOKBANK, C.R., The Swedish System of Industrial Relations, Nova Scotia 
Département of Labour, 1968. A "free system of Collective bargaining", based on the princi-
ple of self-regulation and self-control by the parties, is perhaps best exemplified in Sweden. 
The extensive organization of Swedish workers in unions and of employers in employers' 
organizations has created a balance of power in that country which places strong constraints on 
abuses by one party towards the other, for fear of retaliation. It also evokes a sensé of respon-
sibility on both sides with respect to their potential power to affect the national economy. 
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It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to analyze ail public sector 
employer-union activities within the same context when the variations in 
législation at the provincial level are so great and when further différences 
exist at municipal levels of government. There seems little doubt that the ex-
pansion of union activities in the public sector has added to the complexity 
of employer-union relations, particularly with respect to the adversary 
System, and that trend is central to much of the présent analysis. While 
there are similarities across various levels of government with respect to pat-
terns of employer-union relations which can be useful for comparing certain 
broad principles, the projection of a "model" relationship applying to ail 
three levels would hâve to disregard a number of significant discrepancies. 
For one thing, inclusion in the adversary System has given union 
members in the public sector a steady growth in numbers and in power 
which is now exceeding4 that of their counterparts in the private sector. Pro-
vincial governments hâve, for the most part, followed the lead of the fédéral 
government in its efforts to provide bargaining rights for public sector 
employées, with acquiescence if not encouragement by the employer. 
Private sector unionization, on the other hand, has remained stable5 or ex-
perienced a slight décline over the past décade while further efforts at 
organization hâve faced a considérable degree of informai reluctance on the 
part of private-sector employers. With this trend, it becomes apparent that 
public sector unions are in the process of accomplishing a degree of 
organization within a period of 12 years which private sector unions hâve 
never been able to achieve in Canada. 
Public sector unions negotiating with the Fédéral Government are em-
bracing the strike option6 in préférence to compulsory arbitration in in-
creasing numbers7. In the normal course of events, this will tend to increase 
4 Corporations and Labour Unions Returns Act, 1976, pp's 74-75. In Public Ad-
ministration, 461,807 of an estimated 685,000 workers were union members. This represents 
67.4% of those eligible, and does not include 148,000 members of the Public Service Alliance 
of Canada. This sector has the highest percentage of workers unionized and is second only to 
manufacturing in terms of absolute numbers, the latter sector having 834,844 union members 
in an estimated potential of 1,919,000 (45.5%). 
5 Ibid, "In 1976, 32.2% of an estimated 8,631,000 wage and salaried workers in the 
major industry groups ... were members of labour organizations reporting under the Corpora-
tions and Labour Unions Returns Act". 
6 The Public Service Staff Relations Act allows the Union a choice between two options 
(the right to strike or resort to binding arbitration) in the event that agreement cannot be reach-
ed through collective bargaining. 
7 ANDERSON, V.C., and T.A. KOCHAN, "Collective Bargaining in the Public Ser-
vice of Canada", Relations Industrielles - Industrial Relations, Québec, Vol. 32, No. 2, 1977, 
pp. 234-249. 
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the potential frequency of strikes in the public sector. While the design for 
confrontation between employer and union in the public sector is similar in 
principle to that of the private sector, the pattern which is emerging in prac-
tice reflects some significant différences. In the private sector, an employer 
may décide to "take a strike" with considérable hardship to himself but 
with substantially less difficulty for the gênerai public in most instances. 
In the public sector, however, it is often the gênerai public which 
"takes the strike" if the employer décides to stand firm in the face of union 
demands. At that point, elected members of Parliament tend to find 
themselves in the position of risking their political futures if they do not 
make concessions which will achieve agreement and restore services. Such 
political pressures hâve not been a factor in private sector bargaining where 
confrontation has traditionally focused on économie arguments by both 
sides, and settlements tend to be reached in light of économie constraints 
rather than political pressures. Where the public interest may be seriously 
affected, government has intervened to protect it. 
Use of the adversary System in the public sector is further complicated 
by the fact that government as employer does not resort to the lockout as a 
method for countering the strike option of the union. While such is 
theoretically possible, the idea of government denying services to the tax-
paying public by locking out union members is inconsistent with the man-
date8 of government to serve the people. 
In further contrast to the private sector, the government as employer 
has less opportunity to opt for réduction of the work force as a means pf 
reducing costs when pressed into major concessions through collective 
bargaining. Private sector unions can ensure that procédures for laying off 
workers are fair and consistent, but they can seldom prevent lay-offs. Many 
government workers hâve a form of job tenure, on the other hand, which 
protects them from public or political manipulation or abuse as "servants 
of the Crown*' but which also does not allow them to be laid off or replaced 
easily by technology and other "efficiency" measures. 
Perhaps the most important unexpected conséquence of the émergence 
of public sector bargaining is the increasing tendency of major public sector 
confrontations to be perceived as pace-setters for subséquent negotiations. 
Those familiar with the industrial relations scène in Canada will 
acknowledge the traditional rôle of major employers and unions in the 
8 Until fairly recently, work stoppages through the use of the strike hâve also been re-
jected as an option by some unions such as the Firefighters. Such principles are in the process 
of change; in Sweden, the government as employer has used the lockout against unions. 
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private sector as pace-setters in negotiations. In the steel industry, 
automobile manufacturing, forest products and the like, strong unions hâve 
faced strong employers to argue their cases in the light of économie con-
sidérations, including those of foreign trade and international compétition. 
With a strong power balance between employers and unions, settlements in 
thèse areas are not achieved without substantial considération of the facts 
of économie life, and they hâve tended to establish a level of wage increase 
which subséquent negotiators on both sides corne to use as a guideline. If 
this pacesetting function is increasingly assumed by public sector units at 
the national level, albeit unintentionally, the parameters of bargaining will 
tend to become increasingly political and économie constraints such as pro-
ductivity or markets will be less significant in the context of collective 
bargaining. 
Some significant différences between public and private sectors with 
respect to union affiliation (the right of association) are also worth noting 
hère. Approximately one-third of those employées in the private sector in 
Canada who are eligible for union membership are, in fact, members of 
unions; this percentage has remained relatively stable over the period in 
which public sector unions hâve corne to the fore. If private sector unions 
wish to organize any of the remaining two-thirds, a procédure which usually 
requires potential members to sign cards and pay dues précèdes the applica-
tion for certification of a new bargaining unit. This procédure is based in 
large part on the assumption that private sector employées must 
demonstrate a sincère désire for union membership, a motivation which ex-
tends beyond any simple gesture. As a protection for those who may not 
want to be unionized, a vote is often required to insure that a majority are in 
agreement with the formation of the new bargaining unit. The employer in 
the situation may, and often does, contest the application. In many situa-
tions, the worker who actively indicates an interest in the formation of a 
union local perceives himself to be risking his job if the certification is not 
approved - whether or not that fear is justified. Whatever the complex 
reasons for lack of interest in unionization and collective bargaining on the 
part of private sector employées as compared with public sector employées, 
the fact remains that the private sector work force is still relatively 
unorganized. 
It has already been pointed out that union membership in public ad-
ministration has been growing steadily with the resuit that the percentage 
organized in that sector now exceeds those of the various private sectors. 
There are no constraining procédures for union certification in the public 
sector comparable to those in the private sector, nor does there appear to be 
any presumed "conflict of loyalties" implied in union affiliation for the 
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public sector employée. Has the question ever been raised, as it has been im-
plicitly in the private sector, that there may be a need to protect public sec-
tor employées from union affiliation if they do not wish to be organized? If 
not, why should there be this discrepancy in certification procédures bet-
ween the public and private sectors? Why should the ground rules for 
eligibility to engage in collective bargaining, for partnership in the adver-
sary System, be différent in principle if the "right to représentation in col-
lective bargaining" is similar in principle in both sectors? 
While private sector employées hâve the right, in law, to be represented 
by unions for purposes of collective bargaining, there is no statement of 
principle in Canadian labour législation that establishes the legitimacy of 
this right to the point that interférence with it can be regarded as a serious 
offence. By contrast, consider the following excerpt from the United States 
Labour Management Relations Act9. 
"It is the purpose and policy of this Act, in order to promote the full flow 
of commerce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employées and 
employers in their relations affecting commerce, to provide orderly and 
peaceful procédures for preventing the interférence by either with the 
legitimate rights of the other, to protect the rights of individual employées 
in their relations with labor organizations whose activities affect com-
merce, to define and proscribe practices on the part of labor and manage-
ment which affect commerce and are inimical to the gênerai welfare, and 
to protect the rights of the public in connection with labor disputes affec-
ting commerce." 
The législation from which the above quotation is taken was introduced in 
1947, and amended in 1959. If there is a similar policy - or even philosophy 
-extant in Canadian labour-management relations, it is not established in 
any relevant législation, to the best of my knowledge. 
Dennis McDermott, Président of the Canadian Labour Congress, has 
publicly stated that unions are still not accepted by a large segment of Cana-
dian employers as full partners in the industrial relations process. If such is 
the case, can the adversary System be expected to develop as the basic com-
ponent of a mature industrial democracy in Canada? If the right to union 
représentation can be fully accepted, in practice, in the public sector, 
resulting in a substantial growth in union membership over the past twelve 
years, should this right not also be reinforced and not impeded in the 
private sector? 
There is a somewhat similar lack of organization on the employer side 
in the private sector. Although private sector employers find common cause 
9 BEAL, E., E. WISHERSHAM, and P. KIENEST, The Practice of Collective 
Bargaining, Georgetown, Ontario, Irwin-Dorsey Ltd., 1972, p. 710. 
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in organizations such as the Canadian Manufacturer Association, the 
Canadian Construction Association, and the Canadian Chamber of Com-
merce, none of thèse employers' organizations exist for the primary purpose 
of dealing with unions. This is in sharp contrast to the situation in countries 
like Sweden where the large majority of both employers and employées are 
organized for the purpose of making industrial democracy a way of life 
rather than a theoretical concept. 
For présent purposes, the significance of the Swedish expérience lies in 
the fact that since 1938 a free System of collective bargaining, built upon the 
adversary principle, has developed into a full-fledged industrial democracy 
in the private sector based on the sensé of integrity and responsibility - not 
to mention skill - that has accompanied a high degree of organization on 
both sides. This has not happened in Canada, and in the light of présent 
trends is not likely to do so in the foreseeable future. As a conséquence, the 
various European formulas for industrial democracy and worker participa-
tion, which require elaborate organizational frameworks for effective ad-
ministration, will not be appropriate hère at présent. Participation implies 
involvement, and the majority of employers and workers in the private sec-
tor in Canada are not involved in our free system of collective bargaining 
because they are not organized to participate. 
In some European countries, adversary Systems hâve matured into in-
dustrial democracies; in the private sector in Canada, the adversary system 
is still in early adolescence. In the industrial adversary system, employers 
and unions are opponents; they are not enemies. The same type of relation-
ship prevails between Government and Loyal Opposition in our political 
adversary system. Would the critics of the adversary system in industrial 
democracy also consider the adversary system in political democracy in 
Canada to be out of date? Would they prefer a more "peaceful" Parlia-
ment - without an officiai opposition? 
In spite of a growing body of opinion in some quarters that our pro-
blems of high inflation, high unemployment, lagging growth rate, and ram-
pant industrial disputes are due to an irresponsible and ineffective adversary 
system in the private sector, there are also those10 who feel that the concept 
of industrial democracy is gaining ground in Canada. The définition ad-
vanced for industrial democracy rests upon breaking down "the traditional 
dichotomy between labour and management to allow workers more 
authority and involvement in structuring and controlling their work en-
vironment". 
io NEWTON, Keith, "The Theory and Practice of Industrial Democracy: A Canadian 
Perspective", Economie Council of Canada, Discussion Paper No. 94. 
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If there is to be any reasonable and ready reconciliation between those 
who advocate modification or rejection of the adversary System and those 
who foresee industrial democracy over the immédiate horizon, the power 
and integrity of those employers and unions in the private sector who hâve 
built the traditional System in Canada - and made it work effectively - must 
be preserved and fostered. The major thème of this paper is that, by acci-
dent more than by design, the trend is in the opposite direction. 
In the light of our analysis to this point, it may be more valid to 
redefine the problems surrounding our troubled industrial relations System 
by rephrasing some of the questions. In the public sector in Canada, for ex-
ample, where is the balance of power between employers and unions? When 
the public sector union has the power to strike, does the employer hâve the 
power to take a strike, to lockout, to reduce the work force in the face of in-
creasing costs? Is the adversary system functional for the public sector, 
where it has been introduced by adaptation rather than developed from 
within, but where it is growing apace? In the light of présent trends, will the 
adversary system in the private sector hâve an opportunity to mature into 
industrial democracy or will it die a prématuré death? 
In the past décade, governments hâve not only emerged as major 
employers dealing with unions but they hâve also increased their activities as 
regulators of the private sector, in the public interest. Through the Anti-
Inflation Board in particular, the fédéral government increased controls 
over the collective bargaining relationship between powerful employers and 
powerful unions in the interest of the economy. On the national level also, 
the Trudeau government demonstrated a growing concern for unorganized 
(and less powerful) workers by the introduction of changes to the Canada 
Labour Code. The intent of government in thèse efforts is readily apparent, 
although it has been argued elsewhere that results hâve been less than ex-
pected. What are some of the unexpected results of thèse activities upon this 
relatively immature adversary system which is presently the subject of con-
sidérable criticism? 
In the normal process of collective bargaining, each party cornes to the 
table with a set of initial demands on the other party and thèse are put up 
for negotiation. At the same time, each side has a gênerai (if not spécifie) 
idea of its own point of final résistance, beyond which it will resort to strike 
or lockout rather than make further concessions. This résistance point, of 
course, is not presented for immédiate public scrutiny because it represents 
the minimum of achievement rather than the optimum. While bargaining 
around initial demands, each party is attempting to discover the résistance 
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point11 of the other, hoping in the process that common ground can be 
discovered at a point in excess of the minimum and without resort to work 
stoppage. This is the very essence of a free System of collective bargaining 
and of the adversary process. It is extremely complex in opération because 
each concession must not only be negotiated with représentatives from the 
other side but must also undergo some process of ratification by those "in-
visible committees,, whom the negotiators represent at the bargaining table. 
This is particularly true for union negotiators, who are elected rather than 
appointed, but réputations and expectations are also at stake on the 
management side. 
What happened to this collective bargaining process when the govern-
ment, through the Anti-Inflation Board, superimposed a maximum final 
wage settlement before the process began? While this type of intervention 
did not protect the national economy against inflation, it aborted collective 
bargaining by a prématuré public déclaration of the employer's résistance 
point on wage increases. The customary bargaining procédures were altered 
drastically because the adversaries could not perform their customary rôles, 
resorting instead to stratégies for dealing with the external control 
mechanism, the Anti-Inflation Board. 
Under thèse circumstances, a strike against the employer was tanta-
mount to a strike against the government with the employer relegated to the 
position of frustrated "middle-man". If the final settlement exceeded the 
guidelines, and wage increases were rolled back by the Anti-Inflation 
Board, the union might still expect the full settlement to take effect when 
the Board control was removed. In any event, the self-regulatory 
characteristics of the adversary system were subject to distortion and 
dissipation, along with the sensé of responsibility and commitment which 
generally accompanies them. 
Key negotiators, experienced in collective bargaining, know and 
understand how to function12 effectively in the rôle. They also know and 
understand how their adversaries must function in order to meet their 
responsibilities. Effective negotiations dépend on mutual awareness of thèse 
"patterned Systems of behaviour", and when the pattern is broken by the 
// WALTON, R., and R. MCKERSIE, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations, 
Toronto, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1965, p. 420. 
12 It is acknowledged that the behavioural or functional analysis of employer-union rela-
tions represents a departure from the traditional methods of interprétation. It is the contention 
of this writer, however, that critical factors affecting the field of industrial relations are not 
considered within the more traditional référence points of labour législation and labour 
économies. Employers and unions are represented by people who behave primarily according 
to the responsibilities of their rôles as "ombudsmen" for their constituencies. 
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external imposition of constraints, neither party can accurately understand 
or anticipate the behaviour of the other. Not only is the "dynamic" factor 
lost in negotiations when the parties cannot move beyond predefined limits, 
but it is also unlikely that any sensé of true commitment, normally based on 
legitimate agreement, will be felt by the parties towards the final seulement. 
Under thèse circumstances, erratic and unorthodox behaviour - stemming 
primarily from frustration - should not be unexpected. 
For reasons very similar to those just outlined, the parties involved in 
private sector negotiations hâve been traditionally and adamantly opposed 
to the concept of compulsory arbitration. To a lesser extent than the A.I.B. 
guidelines (which were also reinforced by extrême arbitration power), com-
pulsory arbitration aborts the function of self-determination and pre-
conditions much of the negotiating process, thereby distorting bargaining 
table behaviour. 
At the same time that the government of Canada was attempting to 
control, in the interests of the economy, the adversary System as it is 
reflected in the relationships between private sector employers and unions, 
it was also concerned for those many unorganized workers in the private 
sector who do not hâve the benefit of union affiliation. This concern of 
government was expressed in amendments to the Canada Labour Code13 in-
troduced into Parliament in 1978 which provided an additional statutory 
holiday, additional vacation pay, and other benefits for employées in 
airlines, railways, banking, trucking, broadcasting, communications, port 
opérations and grain handling. Where thèse employées were not members 
of unions with thèse benefits already available, thèse developments would 
be welcomed. By the good grâces of government, the wages and working 
conditions of the less powerful, unorganized workers were brought closer to 
those of the more powerful, organized workers. The intended results are 
clear and unequivocal. 
Be that as it may, what are some of the unexpected results of thèse 
législative changes, particularly for the adversary System in the private sec-
tor? Since many of thèse workers are not organized to represent themselves, 
the government in effect becomes the "negotiator" for them with their 
employer. This is a unilatéral rather than bilatéral process; the employers, 
although required to accept the increased cost which thèse extra benefits 
represent for their opérations, are not in the adversary relationship to 
government. They must therefore absorb thèse costs, increase the price of 
their services, or otherwise make adjustments to décisions which are not 
13 Bill C-8, An Act to Amend the Canada Labour Code, 3rd Session, 30th Parliament, 
26 Elizabeth II, 1977, The House of Commons of Canada. 
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directly subject to their managerial control. For their part, unions in the 
private sector will tend to support thèse trends as progressive, feeling that 
standards established for organized workers are being used as the model to 
be emulated. On the other hand, the private sector unions hâve not been 
successful in organizing the majority of unorganized workers in the private 
sector over a considérable period of years. 
Is it not reasonable to expect that government acting as "business 
agent" for unorganized workers will increase the disinclination of the 
unorganized to join unions? Will this not discourage the expansion of 
private sector unions, in the long term, and serve as a further déterrent to 
the émergence of the free System of collective bargaining into the maturity 
of an industrial democracy? 
If government is willing to act on behalf of unorganized workers, why 
should those workers bother to take advantage of their légal right to be 
represented by unions? Why should they accept the responsibility of paying 
union dues, attending union meetings, accepting leadership responsibilities 
which may place them in the adversary rôle vis-a-vis their employers? Why 
should they spend time, without pay, as union stewards ensuring that the 
new concessions are in fact provided by management? It is assumed, of 
course, that government agents are sufficient - in knowledge and in 
numbers - and available to perform thèse functions on behalf of the 
unorganized. Without the ability to process grievances, the new benefits 
may not be administered fairly. In the émergent industrial democracy fore-
seen for Canada, can workers be expected to assume greater authorïty and 
control over their work environment without themselves accepting some 
form of responsibility for the System? 
In theory, a free System of collective bargaining is expected to provide a 
degree of self-regulation of the economy by employers and unions. In récent 
years, however, strong emphasis has been placed by government on the con-
cept of a tripartite relationship involving employers, unions, and govern-
ment in joint problem-solving - with the expectation of mutual benefits for 
the parties and for greater économie control. Should this be perceived as an 
extension of the adversary System or as the élimination of it? For the adver-
sary system to function as the key component of an industrial democracy, a 
reasonable balance of power is required. If such is the intention, how can 
that balance be achieved when two-thirds of workers in the private sector 
are not members of unions and when their employer counterparts are not 
directly organized for this type of participation? From the viewpoint of 
government, which legitimately represents the total population, could the 
decision-making process be fully shared through a tripartite organization, 
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instigated by government, as it is between employers and unions under the 
adversary System of the private sector? How would unorganized employers 
and workers be represented? 
Government spokesmen on the Ministerial level tend to claim that the 
responsibility for making économie policy for the nation cannot be shared: 
it is the function of the government through Parliament. Under this con-
straint, it would follow that the rôles of employers and unions on a tripar-
tite Council would hâve to be advisory in nature, with control over final 
décisions resting with government. This represents a significant departure 
from the bipartite System of free collective bargaining within which 
employers and unions share both authority and responsibility for reaching 
agreement and for its implementation. If employers and unions are not 
given the opportunity for total participation in a tripartite agreement, can 
they be expected to reflect the sensé of commitment and responsibility 
which - as a matter of record - has been characteristic of the adversary 
System in the private sector in Canada? 
It is possible for government to initiate a form of tripartite negotiations 
which would not only provide greater involvement of employers and unions 
in the concern for the national economy, but would also retain the integrity 
of the free System of collective bargaining? If the présent analysis of the 
situation is valid, the most feasible approach would appear to be through 
the establishment of a Canada Labour Relations Council consisting of 
employers and unions from the pace-setting industries - steel, automobiles, 
forest products, construction, and the like - and provide them with 
resources to negotiate priées and income guidelines for collective bargaining 
on the national level. Within thèse industries is found the économie 
awareness, the negotiating skill, and the truest balance of power required to 
make the adversary System effective. 
Resources of the Economie Council of Canada could be placed at their 
disposai; in this and other ways, government could enable them to establish 
- on a continuing basis - the économie framework within which ail subsé-
quent bargaining in both public and private sectors could be undertaken. 
Where appropriate, Régional Councils could be established on the same 
basis in various parts of the nation to interpret régional variations and to 
gather or disseminate régional information. Thèse units, in turn, could be 
supported by régional information centres. 
According to National Income and Expenditure Accounts (First 
Quarter 1978) published by Statistics Canada, the gross national product 
for Canada in 1977 was approximately 210 billion dollars. During the same 
period, Canada exported over 43 billion dollars worth of products, listed in 
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the Summary of External Trade, December 1977, also produced by 
Statistics Canada. Approximately 21 per cent of our GNP in 1977 depended 
upon exports, and the bulk of those exports were in the form of metals and 
minerais, fabricated materials (wood, paper, iron, steel etc.) and machinery 
or transportation equipment. Thèse commodities are produced in those 
organizations where employer-union relations tend to be most highly 
organized and developed. Pace-setting bargaining in those areas will 
therefore tend to hâve a major impact on the total economy. 
It goes without saying that this type of tripartite approach would be no 
less complex to administer than any other system. On the other hand, it 
would build upon the traditional free system of collective bargaining and 
expand upon the established rôles of the parties, including that of govern-
ment, rather than denying many of thèse legitimate functions of the adver-
sary system. It would also retain the économie milieu rather than the 
political arena as the focal point for collective bargaining, building upon 
established bipartite relationships. Perhaps of most importance, it would 
initiate a framework within which a Canadian pattern of industrial 
democracy could develop from the présent state of "adversary system 
adolescence". 
In this analysis, it has been the intention to increase awareness of the 
implications, for the future of industrial relations in Canada, of major 
developments in employer-union relations over the past décade. It has pro-
ceeded on the assumption that the intentions of ail parties are sensible and 
justifiable from their own perspectives. An effort has also been made to il-
lustrate that the "road to Hell" can be paved with the unexpected results 
which can arise from good but over-simplified intentions. The only 
"villainy" in question hère is that which must be shared by those who 
disregard the longer-range implications of such actions in favour of super-
ficial solutions to current problems. 
Given the présent trends unaltered and even accentuated, the 
émergence of industrial democracy as a future method for handling Cana-
dian industrial relations in a balanced partnership with government is im-
probable. Following the successful pattern of their public sector counter-
parts, private sector unions will tend to become more political In their 
stratégies and activities. Shirley Carr, executive vice-président of the Cana-
dian Labour Congress, is quoted as stating in New York14 that "it is becom-
ing évident that labour's share of the national income will be determined 
less and less by collective bargaining, and more through political decision-
14 "Carr Sees Need for More Labour Muscle", Peter Meerburg, Halifax Mail-Star, 
December 10 th, 1977. 
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making". This view is reinforced by the fact that the national day of protest 
organized by the C.L.C. on October 14, 1976, resulted in 830,000 man-days 
lost - as a political gestuvç. 
The more the legitimate rôle of unions as an equal partner in the adver-
sary System déclines, the more probable will be the transition to political 
avenues as a more effective channel of union power. With many private sec-
tor employers disinclined to accept organized labour as a full partner even 
in a bipartite relationship, the union rôle as anti-establishment "underdog" 
will be accentuated. In the face of continued employer-union conflict, 
governments will feel compelled to institute further controls on both public 
and private sectors or to allow adverse économie circumstances and high 
unemployment to serve as moderating factors. 
Before we relinquish entirely the principle of the adversary System in 
employer-union relations, why not consider formalizing the acknowledged 
power of both parties in the pace-setting industries as an option to imposed 
controls? If "big government" is assumed to take responsibility equal to its 
power, why not place a similar responsibility on "big business*' and "big 
labour"? Who is more knowledgeable in the field of employer-union 
negotiations? Who has more at stake? Thèse units should be further rein-
forced, rather than controlled, on the basis of a performance record in the 
private sector which has been marked as much or more by success as by fric-
tion. 
There is no simple formula to be found, either in Europe or in the 
United States, which can be superimposed upon the complex and troubled 
Canadian scène to résolve ail labour-management problems. From the 
cultural and historical point of view, the Canadian system of industrial rela-
tions is more like the American pattern than European models, but govern-
ment influence and activity in récent years has begun to alter our course. We 
now stand in the middle of our own unique dilemma. The solution, if any, 
will émerge from an increased awareness of the strengths as well as the 
weaknesses of our own system rather than in emulating any other. 
L'antagonisme dans les relations professionnelles au 
Canada: fléau ou bénédiction 
À la fin de 1977, les statistiques publiées par l'Organisation internationale du 
travail plaçaient le Canada et l'Italie au premier rang de 55 pays pour le temps perdu 
des grèves en 1976. Ce n'est pas la première fois dans l'histoire des relations profes-
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sionnelles au Canada qu'une telle situation prévaut. La chose s'est produite en 1919 
et en 1946. Les statistiques estimatives de 1977 laissent prévoir un nombre beaucoup 
moins considérable de grèves en 1976 et il est possible que le sommet ait été atteint et 
qu'il soit chose du passé présentement. Pourquoi notre régime de relations de travail, 
qui a en général donne lieu chaque année à des règlements pacifiques dans 90 pour 
cent des cas, ne semble-t-il pas triompher du syndrome de crise d'une fréquence 
élevée de grèves? 
Le système d'antagonisme est à la base des relations professionnelles au 
Canada. Il est formé par tradition au Canada dans le secteur privé et il est fondé, 
idéologiquement, sur le postulat qu'un employeur fort et un syndicat fort, chacun 
conscient de la puissance de l'autre peuvent négocier une convention collective qui 
intègre les intérêts des deux parties plus efficacement que toute autre méthode qui 
donnerait à l'une ou à l'autre (ou une tierce partie) le pouvoir de prendre les déci-
sions pour les deux. L'antagonisme de ces deux groupes, dans une espèce de 
«balance du pouvoir», a tourné autour du partage des résultats de l'effort économi-
que, pendant que le gouvernement assurait par des mesures législatives les rapports 
entre les parties en tant que gardien de l'intérêt public. Quelles furent, au cours des 
derniers dix ans, les conséquences pour le système d'antagonisme au Canada du 
comportement des employeurs, des syndicats et de l'État? Puisque la pratique de la 
négociation collective au Canada n'est pas une pure question théorique, est-ce que 
l'antagonisme n'est plus à point comme le laissent entendre certaines critiques? 
Le système d'antagonisme fut assez efficace pour décider le gouvernement 
fédéral à adopter en 1967, par la Loi des relations de travail dans la fonction publi-
que, un modèle de négociations collectives, pour ses propres employés du secteur 
public qui contenait des principes identiques d'antagonisme dans la mesure où la 
chose était possible. Le gouvernement détient maintenant une responsabilité comme 
employeur de travailleurs syndiqués tout en restant législateur en ce qui concerne le 
secteur privé. Toutefois, ceci a eu des conséquences notables sur le système d'an-
tagonisme. En particulier, l'inclusion dans le système d'antagonisme des syndiqués 
du secteur public a favorisé leur croissance continue et leur puissance à un point tel 
qu'elles excèdent aujourd'hui celles de leurs homologues du secteur privé. 
L'employeur des secteurs publics tend aussi à se comporter différemment de son 
homologue du secteur privé face à la grève. L'employeur du secteur privé peut 
décider de «subir une grève», qui lui cause beaucoup de tribulations, mais qui lui oc-
casionne aussi beaucoup moins de difficultés en tant que le public en général est con-
cerné dans la plupart des cas. Dans le secteur public cependant, c'est souvent la 
population qui «subit la grève», si l'employeur décide de tenir son bout. Les mem-
bres élus du Parlement ont tendance à se trouver dans la situation de jouer leur 
avenir politique s'ils ne font pas les concessions qui permettent un accord et 
restaurent les services. Le gouvernement en tant qu'employeur ne recourt pas 
habituellement au lock-out pour contrer l'acte de grève de la part du syndicat. Bien 
que le lock-out n'ait pas été utilisé beaucoup par les employeurs du secteur privé, il a 
toujours été considéré comme la contrepartie de la grève et la fréquence de son 
utilisation par les employeurs du secteur privé s'accroît. D'autres options, moins ac-
cessibles à l'employeur du secteur public, sont la rééducation possible de la 
main-d'oeuvre comme moyen de réduire les coûts ou encore le remplacement des 
syndiqués par l'introduction de technologies nouvelles. 
Une autre conséquence imprévue de l'émergence de la négociation collective 
dans le secteur public est la tendance croissante de confrontations importantes qu'on 
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perçoit comme des précédents pour des négociations subséquentes. Cela a toujours 
été le rôle traditionnel des grands employeurs et des grands syndicats dans le secteur 
privé. Dans l'industrie de l'acier, la fabrication des automobiles et l'exploitation des 
produits forestiers et autres, des syndicats puissants ont obligé des employeurs 
puissants à débattre leur cas à la lumière de considérations économiques, y compris 
celles du commerce extérieur et de la concurrence internationale. Grâce à une «forte 
balance du pouvoir entre les employeurs et les syndicats, les ententes dans ces in-
dustries ne sont pas atteintes sans une analyse sérieuse des faits de la vie économique 
et ils établissent des taux d'augmentation des salaires dont les négociateurs suivants 
tiennent compte comme lignes directrices. Si le rôle de l'établissement des précédents 
est de plus en plus assumé par les groupes du secteur public, la négociation tendra à 
devenir davantage politique et les contraintes économiques, comme la productivité 
ou l'état des marchés, auront de moins en moins de signification. 
Il n'y a aucune procédure contraignante en matière d'accréditation dans le 
secteur public qui soit comparable à celles qu'on retrouve dans le secteur privé et il 
apparaît n'y avoir aucun «conflit de loyauté» présumé découlant de l'affiliation syn-
dicale pour l'employé du secteur public. Alors que le nombre des syndiqués du 
secteur public augmente constamment pendant que celui du secteur privé reste 
relativement stable à un tiers environ de la totalité de la main-d'oeuvre, pourquoi 
devrait-il y avoir cette différence dans le processus d'accréditation entre les secteurs 
public et privé? Pourquoi les règles fondamentales d'admissibilité à la négociation 
collective pour les associations dans un même système d'antagonisme sont-elles 
différentes en principe entre les deux secteurs «si le droit de représentation dans la 
négociation collective» est le même en principe dans les deux secteurs? 
Il y a d'une certaine façon un manque d'organisation identique du côté des 
employeurs dans le secteur privé. Bien que les employeurs du secteur privé possèdent 
des intérêts communs dans des organisations comme l'Association canadienne de la 
construction, la Chambre de commerce du Canada, aucune de ces organisations 
d'employeurs n'existe spécifiquement pour traiter avec les syndicats. Il y a un con-
traste frappant avec la situation qui existe dans des pays comme la Suède où la 
grande majorité des employeurs et des salariés sont regroupés en vue de faire de la 
démocratie industrielle un mode de vie plutôt qu'un concept théorique. 
Dans le secteur privé au Canada, le système d'antagonisme est encore dans 
l'adolescence. Sous le système d'antagonisme les employeurs et les syndicats s'oppo-
sent; ils ne sont pas ennemis. Le même type de relations prévaut entre le gouverne-
ment et l'opposition sous le régime de confrontation politique. S'il doit y avoir une 
reconciliation raisonnable et prompte entre ceux qui préconisent la modification ou 
le rejet de l'antagonisme et ceux qui prévoient la démocratie industrielle au Canada 
dans un avenir rapproché, la force et l'intégrité des employeurs et des syndicats du 
secteur privé, qui ont bâti le système traditionnel et en ont assuré l'efficacité, doivent 
être préservés et favorisés. Le thème central de cet article, c'est que, accidentellement 
plutôt qu'intentionnellement, la tendance va présentement en sens contraire. 
Dans son rôle de protecteur de l'intérêt public, l'État a limité le libre système de 
négociation collective dans le secteur privé par une législation accrue. L'influence de 
la Commission de lutte à l'inflation peut avoir contrôlé les augmentations de salaire, 
mais elle a aussi bouleversé le processus de négociation et diminué la responsabilité 
des employeurs et des syndicats dans la négociation de conventions collectives 
viables. Les changements récents au Code canadien du travail ont procuré de 
40 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 35. NO 1 (1980) 
nouveaux avantages aux travailleurs non syndiqués, mais ils ont aussi placé le 
gouvernement dans le rôle d'agent d'affaires pour les travailleurs inorganisés et ils 
ont imposé aux travailleurs des coûts unilatéraux que ceux-ci ont été obligés 
d'assumer. En même temps, le gouvernement a demandé aux employeurs et aux syn-
dicats du secteur privé de s'engager dans des relations tripartites qui peuvent assurer 
dans une certaine mesure l'autorégulation de l'économie. Ceci est-il perçu comme 
une extension de l'antagonisme ou son élimination? Comment une «balance du 
pouvoir» à trois dimensions peut-elle être réalisée quand les deux-tiers des salariés du 
secteur privé ne sont pas membres de syndicats et que la contre-partie patronale n'est 
pas directement organisée pour ce type de participation? Simultanément, les porte-
parole du gouvernement affirment que la responsabilité d'établir une politique 
économique pour l'ensemble de la nation ne peut pas être partagée, qu'elle est la 
fonction du gouvernement par l'intermédiaire du Parlement. Sous de telles con-
traintes, il s'ensuivrait que le rôle des employeurs et des syndicats dans un comité 
tripartite ne devrait être que consultatif, le contrôle des décisions finales demeurant 
l'apanage de l'État. Ceci signifie un abandon significatif du système bipartite de la 
libre négociation collective où les employeurs et les syndicats partagent l'autorité et 
la responsabilité d'en arriver à des accords et de les mettre en oeuvre. 
Comme moyens de faire face à plusieurs de ces problèmes d'une façon qui 
utiliserait, sans en abuser, les forces du système d'antagonisme dans le secteur privé, 
on peut suggérer une approche plus praticable par l'établissement au Canada d'un 
Conseil des relations de travail formé des employeurs et des syndicats des industries 
d'avant-garde - les industries de l'acier, de l'automobile, des produits de la forêt et 
de la construction - en leur fournissant les outils pour négocier les prix et les lignes 
directrices en matière d'augmentation des salaires en vue de la négociation collective 
au niveau national. C'est dans ces industries qu'on trouve la vigilance économique, 
l'habileté à négocier et la vraie «balance du pouvoir» requises pour rendre efficace le 
système d'antagonisme. Les ressources du Conseil économique du Canada pour-
raient être mises à leur disposition. De plus, le gouvernement pourrait leur permettre 
d'établir, sur une base permanente, des cadres économiques à l'intérieur desquels on 
pourrait s'engager dans les négociations ultérieures à la fois dans les secteurs public 
et privé. 
